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Abstract 
Whether ‘employee ownership’ takes the form of worker cooperatives, co-ownership or 
simply employee share ownership plans, there are normally high expectations that a 
range of positive outcomes will result. Yet many empirically-based studies tend to find 
a much more complex picture. An influential segment of that empirical literature has 
posited the need for a number of mutually-reinforcing workforce management 
components to be in place alongside co-ownership. Drawing on detailed case research 
in two large and successful co-owned retailers in Spain and Britain this paper examines 
the role of these wider elements supporting employee ownership. We find that 
employee ownership can be linked to higher productivity and lower employee turnover, 
while at the same time being linked to higher absenteeism and mixed effects on 
attitudes. Expectations held by managers and employees are higher; these expectations 
are not always fully met. The role of managers was also found to be crucial. 
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Introduction 
 
One of the many rationales advanced as justifying employee-owned enterprises is the 
idea that workers in such enterprises will be more engaged and more productive. The 
suggestion is that workers in such enterprises will think and behave differently: the 
essential nature of that difference being that they can be expected to act more like 
‘owners’. This means, for example, that they will be more customer (and market) 
focused as they see the customer rather than the boss as the source of their economic 
futures; they would also be expected to be willing to make sacrifices in hard times in 
order to sustain the enterprise. They would be expected to expend ‘discretionary effort’. 
In managerial language, they might be expected to be more willing than an employee in 
a conventional firm, to ‘go the extra mile’.  
 
Many studies find that employee-owned firms derive favourable effects in terms of 
satisfaction, motivation and behavioural measures such as lower absenteeism and 
reduced labour turnover (Bakan et al. 2004; Brown et al. 1999; Kruse et al. 2004, 2010; 
Long, 1980, 1982; Mc Carthy et al. 2010; Oliver, 1984). Moreover, studies also find 
that these firms have higher productivity on average (O’Boyle et al. 2016).  But other 
studies find neutral effects or even find lower levels of satisfaction and higher levels of 
absenteeism (Arando et al. 2011; Blasi et al. 2008; Keef, 1998; Kruse, 1984; Rhodes 
and Steers, 1981).   
 
Existing research reports generally fail to explain the reasons for such dispersed and 
mixed results. Kruse and Blasi (1995: 25) considered that the mixed results remained 
unexplained because “research has only scratched the surface of the range of other 
human resource policies that might produce positive complementarities with employee 
ownership”. The purpose of this paper is to get beneath that surface. We draw upon the 
results of a detailed comparative study of behaviours in two large retailers with 
employee-ownership characteristics in order to trace the precise impacts of 
‘membership’ of an employee owned enterprise. We did this by locating the study of 
such behaviours in the context of wider economic factors and the wider array of human 
resource management policies and practices.  
 
One of these retailers, Eroski, is based in Spain and is part of the Mondragon 
Cooperatives group, the other, the John Lewis Partnership, is based in the UK and is by 
far the largest co-owned enterprise in that country. We analyze the results from 
employee surveys conducted over multiple years in both companies and we examine 
behavioural responses using measures such as productivity, absenteeism and voluntary 
turnover. Our analysis complements the existing literature by also reporting on the 
reasoning used by managers to account for employee attitudes and behaviours. This 
adds an extra dimension to the understanding of the employee ownership model as does 
the attention we pay to the wider economic context over time.  
 
The John Lewis Partnership has two major business units: John Lewis department stores 
and Waitrose supermarkets. JLP employs nearly 90,000 ‘partners’, mainly in its 48 John 
Lewis department stores and shops and in the 350 Waitrose supermarkets and branches. 
In the 1930s, the founder, John Spedan Lewis, took the highly unusual step of giving 
away a large portion of his ownership of the business to his employees by placing his 
shares in a trust using an ‘irrevocable settlement’ (Spedan Lewis 1954).  The stock as a 
whole rests with the Trust. Managers and workers talk routinely of this arrangement as a 
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co-owned business. The founder also created a checks-and-balances governance system, 
set out in a Constitution. In the founder’s own words, he was embarking on ‘an 
experiment in industrial democracy’ (Spedan Lewis 1948). Partner influence and voice 
is based on a series of elections to representative bodies. Nearly all employees are 
Partners but in recent years some outsourcing arrangements and innovative company to 
company joint enterprise arrangements have resulted in some workers being non-
members. This division has triggered internal debate and concern. 
 
Eroski S.Coop was founded in 1969 as a result of the merger of ten small consumer 
cooperatives located in the Basque Country. In the early 1990s, Eroski began a regional 
expansion to other parts of Spain, opening new hypermarkets and acquiring many 
supermarket chains. As a result of this expansion, Eroski Group became the biggest 
company in Mondragon and the third largest food retailer in Spain. This growth path 
has changed since 2008 as a consequence of the economic crisis. There has been a 
reduction in the number of employees from 52,711 in 2008 to 33,832 in 2014.  
 
Eroski is a consumer and worker cooperative with by-laws that give consumer-members 
and worker-members equal representation on its elected governing bodies. There are 
two governing authorities: the General Assembly and the Governing Council with both 
consumer and worker members being represented on each. The main business of the 
Eroski Group is concentrated in hypermarkets and supermarkets, although the Group 
has diversified into new businesses including drugstores, petrol stations and sports 
equipment stores. In the last two decades, Eroski has employed three kinds of 
employees: (i) ‘cooperative owners’, mainly located in the cooperative parent company 
Eroski S.Coop; (ii) employees with partial ownership (often found in subsidiary 
companies); and (iii) employees without ownership.  
 
In 2013, 33.7% of Eroski employees were ‘employee owners’. Of these, the 
composition was as follows: 8,196 of them were cooperative owners of the parent 
company EROSKI S.Coop., 3,632 were cooperative owners of the second order 
subsidiary cooperative EROSKI Hipermercados S.Coop.,i and 467 were employees with 
partial ownership of the subsidiary Gespa Forum sport stores. The majority of people 
working for Eroski are employees without ownership. This has been the case for the last 
20 years (Storey et al. 2014). The different kinds of employees working for Eroski are 
of particular interest for this research since they allow for a revealing comparative 
analysis in a controlled way of the link between ‘ownership’ and outcomes as measured 
by behaviours and attitudes.  
The positive and negative effects of employee ownership 
 
Several systematic reviews of the literature that analyze the links between employee 
ownership and employee attitudes and behaviours (Caramelli, 2011; Kaarsemaker and 
Poustma, 2006; Kruse, 2002; Kruse and Blasi, 1995) tend to confirm that there is no  
automatic effect of employee ownership on employee attitudes and behaviour. Those 
studies find mixed results and highlight the need for new research to account for 
contingency relationships such as organizational strategy, the internal fit between 
employee ownership and the HRM system, and wider contextual factors.  
 
The arguments used by advocates of employee ownership to justify their mainly 
positive view of the correlation between employee ownership and attitudinal and 
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behavioural responses, are largely based on agency theory.  Linkage of employee 
remuneration and rewards to corporate performance will align employees’ interests with 
those of their employer thereby encouraging them to exert more effort, share 
information, and cooperate with managers and peers to promote the success of the 
company (Pendleton and Robinson, 2010). Within this paradigm, tying employee 
incentives to firm performance is expected to heighten employee morale, provide a 
direct motivation for individual effort, and furnish a rationale for mutual monitoring 
(Bonin et al. 1993). Greater employment security offered by employee-owned 
companies is also seen as a motivational factor (Blair, 1995; Kramer, 2010; Pendleton 
and Robinson, 2010). 
 
Klein (1987) presented three models of the psychological effects of employee 
ownership.  The first, the “intrinsic satisfaction model”, suggests that a sense of 
employee ownership is, in itself, sufficient to increase employees’ commitment to, and 
satisfaction with, the company. The second, the “instrumental satisfaction model”, 
suggests employee ownership must be matched with an increase in the opportunities for 
worker participation in decision making. The third model, ‘extrinsic satisfaction’, 
suggests that employee ownership increases commitment if it is materially rewarding to 
employees.  
 
Klein (1987) found no support for the intrinsic satisfaction model, but her results did 
lend support to the extrinsic and instrumental satisfaction models. She noted that ‘there 
must be an intervening variable - financial gain or participative management or both - 
for employee ownership to be associated with employee satisfaction and commitment.’ 
(1987: 329) 
 
The ‘instrumental satisfaction’ model has been the subject of much research. Many 
researchers underscore the necessity of complementing employee ownership with an 
increased employee participation in decision making in order to increase satisfaction 
and commitment. So, the ‘complementary hypothesis’ is that there is a mutually-
reinforcing effect that derives from ownership and influence. Nevertheless, as 
Kaarsemaker and Poustma (2006) and Pendleton and Robinson (2010) observe, the 
empirical evidence for the apparent link between employee ownership and its positive 
impact on participation is still remarkably weak.  
 
Kruse et al (2004) propose a “three prong hypothesis” which adds innovative human 
resource policies to the mix. This suggests a positive interplay between ownership, 
participation in decision making, and supportive HR policies. Kruse et al (2004) using 
data from 14 ESOP companies, find positive evidence for this hypothesis (2010) 
relating worker-reported outcomes to ownership, participation and HR policies that 
encourage participation and reduce the free riding problem. According to Kruse et al. 
(2010) and Kurtulus and Kruse (2017), satisfaction increases when shared capitalism is 
combined with increased participation in decision making and with high-performance 
HR policies (e.g. being in an employee involvement team, job security and training) and 
low levels of supervision. Explaining the model even further, Kaarsemaker and Poustma 
(2006) consider that in order to create an “Ownership High-Performance Work 
System”, employee ownership needs the additional presence of five core HRM 
practices: participation in decision making; information sharing; training for business 
literacy; mediation; and profit sharing.   
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Among the factors of employee owned companies that can generate negative effects on 
employee attitudes and behaviours, the risk of “free-riding” is the most cited (Bonin et 
al 1993; Klein, 1987; Kruse et al. 2004; McCarthy et al. 2010; Pendleton and Robinson, 
2010). Given that financial rewards are shared with co- owners, as the number of 
employee owners grows, the link between an individual’s effort and the reward s/he 
receives becomes weaker and the risk of shirking or free-riding increases. The 
opportunity to free ride ‘can undermine even the best ownership incentive… destroying 
employee morale’ (Kruse et al. 2004, 105).  
 
Another potential source of dissatisfaction in employee owned companies, especially 
for risk averse, low paid and economically insecure workers, is the extra risk that 
employee ownership implies to the income of partners (Blasi et al. 2010; Kruse and 
Blasi, 1995; Kuvaas, 2003). Raised and not fulfilled expectations among employee 
owners may also cause negative outcomes (Arando et al. 2011; Ben-Ner and Jones, 
1995; Klein and Hall, 1988; Kruse and Blasi, 1995; McCarthy et al. 2010).   
 
Employment security is normally expected to have a positive effect on employee 
attitudes and behaviours, but Blasi et al. (2008) find higher absenteeism rates among 
employee owners and suggest that “it may be” that a greater sense of job security 
underlies those results. According to Long (1982) and Kruse (1984), a process of 
‘involvement deterioration’ over time can occur in employee owned companies. This 
implies that a lack of impact might result from a taken-for-grantedness of the ownership 
status. Its saliency can subside unless active steps are taken to periodically refresh the 
idea. 
 
In the research reported below, we seek to take this body of literature forward by 
presenting evidence of positive and negative outcomes of employee ownership in two 
large comparator firms, and by digging deep into the reasoning which managers bring to 
the evidence they have before them. We analyse their practical theorising of the links 
between the employee owned models they promote and the behavioural results which 
they monitor.  
Methodology 
One distinctive feature of the study design is that it combines positivist methods with 
interpretivist methods. The cases we investigated met the guidance offered by Stake 
(1994), that is, they offer significant opportunities to learn about the issues under 
investigation. Having access to knowledgeable informants, and to rich and longitudinal 
quantitative data of the two biggest employee owned retail companies in the world, 
offered the possibility to gain rich insights. Choosing those two companies also 
highlighted a key issue, given that one of them (JLP) has been very commercially 
successful, while Eroski has faced many problems since 2008. As these two different 
economic situations can themselves affect attitudinal and behavioural responses, we 
have included quantitative data over extended periods. 
We gathered quantitative data from diverse sources. In Eroski we had access to the 
results of the 2008 hypermarket employee satisfaction survey answered by 4,328 
employees and to a more complex culture-leadership-satisfaction survey conducted in 
2011 and answered by 23,543 employees. Eroski offers the possibility of conducting 
between-groups cross-sectional comparisons of attitudinal and behavioural responses of 
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employee owners and non-owners because it employs considerable numbers of each 
category. We also gathered data on absenteeism and voluntary turnover rates for 
cooperative owners and non-owner employees for the 2005-2014 period.  
In the case of John Lewis, we had access to the results of the 2011, 2012 and 2013 
Partner Surveys.  The survey results in John Lewis include a comparison of the 
responses given by partners with responses to similar questions in surveys conducted by 
an external benchmarking sample of 1,824,040 employees working for 337 large 
organizationsii. Additionally, we were able to correlate results from the attitude surveys 
with behavioural results such as absenteeism and productivity from selective stores.  
We were not able to conduct regressions because we didn’t have direct access to the 
microdata of those surveys. Instead we relied on the data owners, the HR managers of 
both companies, to provide tabulations and run the descriptive statistics we requested.   
Armed with the accumulated data on employee behaviours and attitudes we interrogated 
managers about their own interpretations of the data and the ways in which they made 
sense of the data. Beyond that, using interview techniques, we inquired into their 
intended strategies and their rationales. We constructed a common framework to 
research the two cases and drew on our extensive background knowledge of both cases 
extending over ten years. The initial comparative framework was iterated between the 
two research teams in the UK and Spain and then applied to both JLP and Eroski. In the 
most recent phase of our work with John Lewis, interviews took place over a 24 month 
period. Interviews were conducted with members of the main board and also with 
members of the management boards of John Lewis (department stores) and Waitrose 
(supermarkets). Further interviews took place with senior managers in finance, logistics, 
human resource management and other central functions. A total of 25 managers were 
interviewed. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Further, we were allowed 
access to the archives and from these a very detailed timeline was constructed which 
revealed variations in business policy and democratic arrangements over time. 
Additionally, we were able to observe managerial and board meetings. 
In Eroski, eleven interviews were conducted with senior managers. We placed a special 
focus on human resource policies and practices. In order to reinforce the longitudinal 
view for the case of Eroski we also interviewed the former president for the period 
1995-2011 and used the data emerging from four conferences held between 2011 and 
2015 with the currently serving president, the chief executive officer and the former 
president. Each of these interviews and events were recorded, transcribed and used in 
the research. An additional interview was held in February 2016 with the researcher in 
Mondragon University in charge of conducting the culture-leadership satisfaction 
survey in Eroski and in other Mondragon cooperatives.    
As recommended in the literature (Gibbert et al. 2008), in order to increase the 
reliability of our analysis of the interviews, two peers not co-authoring the paper 
independently analyzed the transcripts of the interviews and discussed and reviewed the 
draft of the paper. With the same purpose in mind, a review of drafts was also made by 
key informants in both companies between December 2015 and January 2016. 
Results 
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For each case we consider: productivity; employee turnover; and attitudes/satisfaction 
levels. 
 
Eroski 
 
Productivity 
 
According to managers in Eroski, productivity measured both by sales per employee 
and by sales per square meter, has normally been higher in the cooperative business 
than in subsidiaries without cooperative members. Data is shown in Table 1 for the 
2008-2015 period.  
 
Table 1. - Productivity measured as sales per employee in Eroski S.Coop vs subsidiaries (in 
thousands €). 
2008  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  2014  2015
Sales Eroski S.Coop  2,591,516  2,257,354 2,011,081 1,893,679 1,847,222 1,771,302  1,752,374  1,749,190
Average N coop workers 
Eroski S.Coop  8,426  8,935 8,229 8,463 8,308 8,219  7,978  7,812
Average N non‐coop 
workers Eroski S.Coop  3,059  1,827 2,321 2,424 2,575 2,441  2,736  3,062
Sales/Employee Eroski 
S.Coop  225.645  209.752 190.623 173.939 169.734 166.163  163.559  160.859
Sales subsidiaries  5,553,214  5,349,302 5,326,878 4,745,396 4,374,568 3,760,622  3,697,488  3,530,100
Average N employees 
subsidiaries  44,279  38,604 36,420 33,371 31,554 27,448  27,101  27,152
Sales/Employee 
Subsidiaries  125.414  138.568 146.262 142.201 138.637 137.008  136.433  130.012
Source: Data gathered from annual accounts. Available at www.cnmv.es (National Stock Market 
Commission) 
 
As Table 1 shows, productivity in the parent company has been higher than in 
subsidiaries every year from and including 2008 to 2015. The same pattern occurred in 
the pre-crisis 2001-2007 period. The gap has been reduced in the 2008-2015 period 
mainly due to the sale or closure of deficit stores in the subsidiaries. The reduction of 
stores in subsidiaries has also resulted in a reduction in the sales of the cooperative 
parent company to its subsidiaries, thus reducing the productivity of the cooperative 
parent company. 
 
So, in headline terms, there is clear evidence that productivity is indeed higher in the 
employee-owned parts of the organisation. However, it is necessary to dig deeper in 
order to consider other variables. For example, productivity ratios can be influenced by 
other factors such as the different sizes and kinds of stores in the cooperativized 
business and in the subsidiaries. Productivity comparisons need to be conducted 
comparing stores of similar size and kind. Such a comparison is available from research 
data from 2006 and 2007. This revealed that monthly average sales per employee were 
34% higher in Eroski coop hypermarkets than in partially employee owned hypermarket 
subsidiaries.  In the case of supermarkets, sales per employee were 39% higher in coop 
stores than in supermarkets partially owned by employees and 41% higher than in stores 
with no employee partnership (Arando et al. 2014, p. 45) 
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However, all of the managers we interviewed contended that, as far as they were 
concerned, there is no scientific study that fully convinces them that the higher 
productivity of the cooperativized business can be unequivocally be attributed to its 
cooperative nature. For example:  
 
We have data that shows that there is higher productivity in stores with 
cooperative members than in stores with non-members. Are these differences 
because the employees are members or due to differences in the geographical 
areas where those stores are? If the stores where the majority of members are, 
are located in a region where we are leaders, where we have higher sales per 
square meter, logically productivity is higher in those stores. Simply because 
there is more activity. (Eroski Manager 1) 
 
Nevertheless, many of the interviewees – including the President, the CEO, and the 
managers of the area of human resources tended to hold to a belief that the cooperative 
nature did impact on behaviour. So, for example: 
 
We want to cooperativizise the subsidiaries, because we believe that at this 
cooperative stage there are much higher levels of engagement in all professional 
levels, particularly in stores. We also believe there are differences in intangible 
elements, such as strictly relational elements, the way in which the stores have 
some positive energy, a positive energy that is transmitted by the people that 
work in the organization they co-own and therefore feel they are working for 
themselves. That is an absolutely unique competitive advantage, it is not 
imitable by other organizations. And so we know that there's a certain 
differential element between the cooperativized business and the non-
cooperatived one, although there is no scientific study that correlates the higher 
productivity of our cooperativized business with its cooperative nature  (Eroski 
manager 6) 
  
Thus, the interim conclusion from the productivity data is that there is a prima facie 
case that the cooperative characteristics are conducive to positive productivity 
outcomes, but that because of confounding variables, it is necessary to dig deeper to 
gain a more rounded assessment.   
 
Labour turnover 
 
Low voluntary turnover rates were considered as one indicator of commitment among 
coop members in the Mondragon cooperatives by Bradley and Gelb (1982). According 
to our interviewees, thirty years after those studies, voluntary turnover rates of coop 
members in Eroski are still lower than that of non-members and lower than those of 
other food retailers in Spain. Comparative data on labour turnover are shown in Table 2.  
 
Unfortunately, the data does not differentiate between voluntary and involuntary 
turnover. But the HR manager and other informants were able to make interpretations of 
the data that helped distinguish the roles of voluntary and involuntary turnover.  
 
 Table 2: Average monthly labour turnover rates in Eroski (2005-2014)* 
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Coop owners in 
Eroski S. Coop. 
Employees with 
partial ownership 
(since 2012 coop 
owners of second 
degree coop)  
Employees without ownership 
 
N** % 
Monthly 
Turnover 
N** % 
Monthly 
Turnover 
N**iii % Monthly 
Turnover 
Permanent 
employees
% Monthly 
Turnover 
Temporary 
employees 
2005 6,930 0.20% 3,878 0.70% 12,293 0.31% 19.60% 
2006 6,994 0.21% 4,215 0.85% 13,111 0.72% 23.03% 
2007 7,199 0.21% 4,595 0.79% 24,846 1.33% 27.15% 
2008 7,709 0.25% 5,319 0.55% 33,296 1.06% 14.88% 
2009 7,916 0.25% 5,523 0.54% 28,807 0.88% 16.74% 
2010 7,518 0.25% 5,092 0.66% 26,786 1.09% 15.61% 
2011 7,351 0.20% 4,835 0.78% 24,284 0.65% 14.56% 
2012 7,227 0.13% 4,270 0.48% 23,228 0.61% 16.40% 
2013 7,166 0.15% 3,564 0.28% 22,173 0.70% 16.09% 
2014 6,979 0.08% 3,504 0.34% 21,810 0.39% 16.44% 
Source: Data gathered from the company 
* % of people of the total workforce who ceased their labor relationship with the company during the 
month (and are not hired again in the same month)  
** Equivalent full working day employees. 
 
High turnover rates are found among temporary employees, but it is difficult to read too 
much into this because often this group is hired on very short term contracts. Informants 
attributed the higher turnover of temporary employees in years previous to the crisis 
(2005-2007) to higher voluntary turnover. Both in the economic boom and in the crisis 
years, turnover rates of permanent employees and employees with partial ownership 
have been low, and even much lower in the case of the parent company cooperative 
owners. Those low turnover rates reflect low voluntary turnover in both collectives. The 
low turnover of coop cashiers and professionals was seen as a sign of commitment and 
also as a response to a suite of human resource policies, mainly pay policy (since the 
salaries of the majority of members are higher than the market), profit sharing and 
employment security.  The effects of those human resource practices on turnover were 
considered in conjunction with other contextual factors. Given the high unemployment 
rates in the Spanish economy, informants argued that employment security offered by 
Eroski is a key factor that ties coop owners to the company - as in other Mondragon 
coops (Heras, 2014). However, job security ties to the company not only the highly 
engaged members, but also a number of members who are unsatisfied but have no better 
employment alternatives.  
 
If pay policy helps to explain the low turnover of most coop members, it doesn’t explain 
the retention of managers. The principle of ‘wage solidarity’, one of Mondragon’s 
cooperative principles, presupposes low pay differentials in Mondragon cooperatives. 
The salary of the President of Eroski is limited to 7.8 times the salary of the lower paid 
coop member, and the salary of the CEO is limited to 7 times the lower rate. As a 
consequence, their salaries are 72% lower than in similar firms. Some 75 managers of 
first and second tiers of the organizational chart receive salaries that are 50-60% lower 
than in comparable size firms. Managers in each hypermarket and most technicians in 
central offices, earn 10-20% less than those in competitors. Despite these levels of 
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remuneration, voluntary turnover of managers in Eroski remains very low (1 or 2% per 
year among the 80-90 positions of maximum responsibility of Eroski S.Coop and 2% 
among hypermarket managers).  
 
Satisfaction and attitudes 
 
A further possible indicator is the attitude to wage restraint. Since 2008, Eroski has been 
facing challenging financial problems. In order to help address these, Eroski working 
members have increased working hours and reduced their own wages. According to 
interviewees, those decisions are a sign of high adhesion and commitment levels: 
 
We have just subjected the decision to reduce our pay to the vote of members. 
92% of members voted, and 79% said ‘yes’ to a reduction of their wage. The 
average member is a cashier with a salary not much higher than 1,000 euro a 
month and has said yes to reduce the salary. I think that this shows an extreme 
level of commitment and adhesion. (Eroski Manager 2) 
  
The explanation given by some managers to those high levels of commitment is in line 
with Klein’s (1987) instrumental satisfaction model: 
 
As a partner you have much more information, more data, you know how the 
business is, you feel it is part of you. This allows you to take difficult steps like 
the decision to increase our working hours and reduce our wages. (Eroski 
Manager 9) 
 
However, as we will see, not all managerial analysis reflects such a straightforward link 
between employee ownership participation and employee attitudes and behaviours. 
 
Apart from higher productivity and lower voluntary turnover, some of the first 
researchers of the ‘Mondragon Experience’ highlighted that absenteeism rates of coop 
members were about half those in comparable local firms (Bradley and Gelb, 1981; 
Thomas and Logan, 1982). However, three decades on, the situation is quite different. 
In the specific case of Eroski, this cooperative annually exceeds the sick leave payment 
goals established by Mondragon’s corporate social provision body. Absenteeism rates 
of coop members have been consistently higher than those of non-members since 2009 
(see Table 3).  
  
 
Table 3: Sick leave rates* of Eroski working coop members; employees with 
partial ownership and non-members (2005-14) 
 
 
Coop 
owners 
Eroski S. 
Coop. 
Employees 
with partial 
ownership 
(since 2012 
coop 
owners of 
second 
degree 
coop)  
Permanent 
employees 
Temporary 
employees 
2005 6.61% 6.52% 6.15% 2.52% 
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2006 6.36% 6.58% 7.19% 2.38% 
2007 5.99% 6.01% 6.79% 2.95% 
2008 5.40% 5.51% 6.45% 2.82% 
2009 6.02% 5.12% 5.88% 1.98% 
2010 7.21% 4.54% 5.48% 1.59% 
2011 6.51% 4.08% 5.02% 1.50% 
2012 5.26% 3.11% 4.05% 1.19% 
2013 5.44% 2.96% 4.09% 1.32% 
2014 5.82% 3.32% 4.69% 1.28% 
*Sick leave rates= % of sick and accident leave hours / total working hours 
Source: Data gathered from the company.   
 
Given older workers tend to have more health problems, we considered age differences 
as a control variable. The average age of coop members and non- members was 
provided for 3 different years. In 2005 these were 37.02 for coop members vs 31.78 for 
non- members. In 2010: 40.46 vs 35.70; and 2014: 43.66 vs 38.79. Interviewed 
managers considered that older average age of members can explain some sick leaves, 
but it wouldn’t be a major explanation for the differences seen on Table 3. In fact, the 
average age of coop members was also higher in the 2005-2008 period when 
absenteeism rates of coop members were no higher than those of permanent non-owner 
workers.  
 
Interviewed managers interpreted absenteeism rates as a “silent response” of some 
cooperative owners to austerity measures and were concerned about the possible link 
between absenteeism, low commitment and shirking:  
  
We think that a proportion of coop members are dissatisfied or have a low 
commitment with their job and, when they get sick, they lengthen the time they 
stay at home two days more than the average employee in society. (Eroski 
Manager 6) 
 
This idea that measures such as absenteeism may reflect a lack of responsible 
engagement with the cooperative project goes to the heart of the debate about 
behavioural outcomes of employee ownership. For example:   
 
During the first two years of the crisis, 2009-2010, there was a very strong 
reduction in absenteeism within the non-cooperative subsidiaries of Eroski 
Group, but there was a rise in the parent cooperative firm. That rise in 
absenteeism was a reflection of discomfort on the part of the working members 
... as working members, having a job virtually guaranteed allowed them to have 
that kind of reaction. (Eroski Manager 6, emphasis added) 
 
Higher productivity levels in the cooperative parent company imply higher stress and 
workload for coop members. During the crisis there has been a reduction in the number 
of non-owners working in the cooperative parent company (as a sign of this reduction, 
wage costs of non-owners in Eroski S.Coop went from 47 million euro to 28.5 million 
euro in 2009). This increased the workload of cooperative workers. Most of the 
managers highlighted the decision of coop members to increase their working hours (by 
10% in 2009, then lowered to a 5% in 2011) and to reduce their wages as a sign of high 
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commitment, but some also highlighted that those measures have a negative impact on 
satisfaction and absenteeism levels of many members. Working longer hours, together 
with the increased number of tasks each member has to handle in each store have 
generated fatigue and that would be an important cause of higher absenteeism among 
coop owners in the 2009-2014 period.    
 
Employee attitude results 
 
We found lower satisfaction rates of coop members as recorded in a series of employee 
satisfaction surveys conducted in Eroski. The results of the 2006 and the 2008 
satisfaction surveys revealed lower satisfaction among coop members significant at the 
1% level for the 2008 survey and at the 5% level for the 2006 survey (Arando et al. 
(2011; Luu, 2011). They found lower satisfaction across a range of measures including 
attitudes to recognition, salary, labour conditions, information and communication, 
management style, training, promotion, innovation, change management and so on.   
 
The lower satisfaction is striking since those surveys came after a long period of strong 
economic results and high levels of profit sharing among coop owners (Hernando, 
2013). Besides, coop members received higher pay, had many more possibilities for 
participating in decision making and were subject to a greater variety of initiatives 
normally associated with sophisticated human resource management. The three-prong 
hypothesis was thus found to be problematic in Eroski (Arando et al. 2011; Luu, 2011). 
Such results were attributed to higher expectations among members.   
 
In order to explore these issues more deeply, we accessed the results of a ‘culture-
leadership survey’ conducted in 2011. This surveyed 5,362 employees of the 
cooperative parent company and 18,181 employees of subsidiaries. This survey also 
included three questions to measure the satisfaction of employees and four questions to 
measure their commitment. Perceptions of the availability and strength of human 
resource policies (training, participation, information and autonomy) were evaluated via 
three questions for each policy. The comparative results between the different Eroski 
employee collectives (coop owners, employees with partial ownership, permanent 
employees and temporary employees) can be seen in Table 4. 
 
Interviewed managers noted that most of the survey questions related to satisfaction 
received a relatively high mark by employees and cooperative owners (over 4 on a 1-6 
scale). Those results, they argued, were better than in most industrial cooperatives of 
Mondragon that use the same survey. Nevertheless, as in the 2006 and 2008 surveys, 
satisfaction measured in 2011 for cooperative members was significantly lower than for 
the other employee categories. Commitment was also lower, especially when compared 
with employees in subsidiaries with partial ownership. 
 
Even if training, participation, autonomy and information opportunities provided in the 
parent cooperative company to coop owners are higher than those provided to 
employees with partial ownership in subsidiaries, the perception of those policies by 
coop owners is poorer. Those poorer perceptions of HR policies by coop members were 
also present in 2006 and 2008 Eroski satisfaction surveys analyzed by Luu (2011) and 
Arando et al (2011). In the 2011 survey, the perception of one of the policies, training, 
is lower for cooperative owners than for the rest of the employee groups. 
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Given the large sample sizes, even small differences are highly significant, mainly when 
we compare coop owners with employees of subsidiaries with partial ownership. That is 
why we have measured the effect size. Low Cohen’s d effect sizes in some of the HR 
policy items (cohen‘s d<0.3) suggest that the differences between coop owners and 
employees without ownership on different perception levels of HR policies are lower 
than previously predicted.   
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 Table 4 Comparative Satisfaction, engagement and evaluation of HR policies by Eroski coop members vs. Rest of employees. 2011. 
Variable Group N Mean 
(std) 
Comparison 
Group 
N Mean 
(std)  
Mean difference 
from coop owners 
Cohen’s d 
Satisfaction Coop 
owners 
 4,548 4.4871 
(0.98) 
Employees with partial 
ownership 
3,427 4.8685 
(0.81) 
-0.38143*** 0.42 
Permanent employees 11,589 4.7932 
(0.95) 
-0.30610*** 0.32 
Temporary employees 3,126 5.0729 
(0.82) 
-0.58587*** 0.65 
Engagement Coop 
owners 
 4,563 4.0235 
(1.19) 
Employees with partial 
ownership 
3,432 4.4308 
(1.01) 
-0.40732*** 0.37 
Permanent employees 11,602 4.0523 
(1.14) 
-0.02876 0.02 
Temporary employees 3,133 4.1386 
(1.02) 
-0.11508*** 0.10 
Training Coop 
owners 
4,581 3.3872 
(1.21) 
Employees with partial 
ownership 
3,445 3.9172 
(1.08) 
-0.52996*** 0.46 
Permanent employees 11,641 3.7416 
(1.14) 
-0.3584*** 0.29 
Temporary employees 3,144 4.1361 
(1.02) 
-0.74892*** 0.63 
Participation Coop 
owners 
4,569 3.6752 
(1.24) 
Employees with partial 
ownership 
3,447 4.1573 
(1.04) 
-0.48213*** 0.42 
Permanent employees 11,606 3.7312 
(1.28) 
-0.05600** 0.04 
Temporary employees 3,111 3.5954 
(1.26) 
0.07979** 0.06 
Autonomy Coop 
owners 
4,568 3.9370 
(1.24) 
Employees with partial 
ownership 
3,445 4.2439 
(1.14) 
-0.30698*** 0.26 
Permanent employees 11,620 3.7475 
(1.32) 
0.18942*** 0.15 
Temporary employees 3,125 3.6190 
(1.27) 
0.31797*** 0.25 
Information Coop 
owners 
4,569 4.2433 
(1.00) 
Employees with partial 
ownership 
3,447 4.5707 
(0.89) 
-0.32738*** 0.35 
Permanent employees 11,629 4.1768 
(1.10) 
0.06654*** 0.06 
Temporary employees 3,140 4.1636 
(1.10) 
0.07967*** 0.08 
**The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level ; *** The mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level 
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The effect of age or tenure on those different perceptions of HR policies was not 
measured in these surveys.   
 
Interviewed managers considered that raised, but unfulfilled, expectations among coop 
members was the main cause for lower levels of satisfaction. This reflects previous 
research (Arando et al. 2011; Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995; Klein and Hall, 1988; Kruse 
and Blasi, 1995; McCarthy et al. 2010). Another reason, shared by most interviewed 
managers, for employee dissatisfaction was the policy of egalitarianism and consequent 
subdued link between pay and performance:  
 
We consider everybody equally, independently of them doing a good, mediocre 
or poor work. In other companies, if you do a better job, you have a bonus for 
your individual performance. (Eroski Manager 1) 
 
The way profit sharing is conducted in Eroski, based in cooperative principles, 
reinforces egalitarianism and makes it difficult to see a link between individual effort 
and financial reward. One reason they cited for the failure to make changes is the strong 
opposition from cooperative members sitting on the governing bodies. Thus, the 
guardians (custodians) of the cooperative system are seen to act as a brake on managers’ 
pragmatic commercial instincts.  
 
Informants argued that in the context of the financial crisis it became more necessary 
than ever to promote pay-for-performance but that they met resistance: 
  
I've had no more problems than when we tried to change the remuneration of 
partners to differentiate it more. Yet the modification was relatively minor.  This 
year a cornerstone in our strategic plan is to link pay and performance. We aim 
to do this for survival. (Eroski Manager 2) 
 
The ‘ideal’ of egalitarianism is seen as less tolerable when survival is at stake. The 
implication is that the policy is perceived as an ideal which, in ‘normal times’, is 
pursued for reasons other than commercial advantage.  There is an underlying tension in 
cooperative environments where the interdependence of work contributions is valued 
and so group-based incentive schemes seem a natural fit. But, as equity theory would 
predict, workers as well as managers may regard equal reward for unequal effort and 
contribution as unfair. In this case however, managers believed that they were the ones 
being restricted in taking the necessary measures to address this tension. Arguably, this 
reflected a failure of communication.    
 
A related tension was found in the policy of employment security. This also had dual 
effects. On the one hand, managers contended that they found it difficult to sanction 
cases of poor performance. They suggested that this prompted supervisors to shirk in 
their monitoring tasks:  
 
We have many supervisors not doing well what they have to do, which is to be 
exigent with their teams and get results (...) He who wants to works, works, and 
the one who doesn’t want to work, shirks. And the supervisor that has to say 
something to the shirking member thinks: “why will I say something to him, if 
it’s going to be a problem for me, if nobody will help me to make this guy work. 
There is no current corporate culture that will encourage the manager to use 
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tools of negative discrimination, so you generate a culture of lack of demand, a 
culture of comfort (Eroski Manager 9) 
 
Yet, on the other hand, a sense of employment security can have positive effects 
including, for example, that it allows workers to exercise productive voice (Freeman 
and Medoff, 1984). However, the managers interviewed tended not to make this 
counterbalancing point preferring instead to emphasize their sense of restricted action. 
 
Other factors mentioned were that engagement deteriorated over time; the increased 
workload for members following the 2008 crisis; and there had been a failure to build 
on the previous long period of success in order to foster a culture of ‘pride of 
belonging’. One of the interviewees, experienced in conducting employee surveys, 
offered an additional explanation: the “hyper-critical attitude” of coop owners and their 
willingness to voice complaints. This attitude can lead to lower expressed satisfaction, 
even if conditions are objectively equal or even better than for non-owners. This 
explanation is in line with previous research comparing satisfaction of unionized versus 
non-unionized workers (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  
 
With these findings in mind we can now turn to the second case-study in order to see 
whether similar patterns emerge.  
Behavioural and attitudinal responses in the John Lewis Partnership 
 
Productivity 
 
The first point to note in relation to JLP is that in terms of measures of comparative 
commercial performance in recent years, it has been extraordinarily successful. In a 
tough market where many competitor retailers have folded and others have lost sales, 
JLP has been noted as bucking the trend. In the media, its success is routinely attributed 
to its employee ownership. In other words, one major possible positive outcome from 
the employee-ownership effect might be sheer survival.  
 
Commercial success there has certainly been. The Partnership continues to grow year by 
year both in sales and in staff numbers. Table 5 below summarises JLP’s financial 
performance since 2007 
 
Table 5: JLP: 6-year performance summary (£m) 
Year  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
         
Sales (£m) 10172 9541 8730 8206 7422 6968 6763 6362
Sales growth over 
previous year (%) 
6.6 9.3 6.4 10.6 6.5 3.0 6.3 - 
Revenue  (1) 9028 8466 7759 7362 6735 6267 6052 5686
Revenue growth over 
previous year (%) 
6.6 9.1 5.4 9.3 7.5 3.6 6.4 - 
Net (Post-Tax) Profits (2) 304 312 301 322 258 359 
(3) 
320 263 
Partnership Bonus (£m) 203 211 165 195 151 125 181 154 
Bonus (% of Salaries) 15 17 14 18 15 13 20 18 
Retained Profits (£m) 102 101 136 127 107 233 130 108 
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(2) 
Notes 
(1) Revenue = Sales less VAT and ‘sale or return’ sales 
(2) Profits after tax but prior to Partnership Bonus 
(3) Profits affected by exceptional gain 
 
Hence, if one measures performance on the basis of sales, this co-owned business is 
doing remarkably well: it enjoyed a 60% growth in sales between 2007 and 2014. This 
was a period of double dip recession in the economy as a whole. There has also been 
consistent year on year growth in partner numbers: from 76,800 in 2010 to 90,962 in 
2013.  
 
So, sales are evidently consistently healthy over long periods. However, senior 
management remain convinced that they have not yet been able to fully exploit the co-
ownership potential.  This is a constant theme. There is more productivity to achieve, 
more efficiencies to be implemented.  This is why increasingly senior management 
emphasize not only the rights and rewards of partners but their responsibilities. The 
level of managerial expectation of the value to be gleaned from the Partnership model is 
high. 
 
Sickness absence 
 
Across the Partnership, sickness absence is lower than average compared with the retail 
sector as a whole. The retail sector average in 2012 was 6.8% and average rates across 
the economy in 2012-13 were 7% (CIPD 2013). In the JLP Waitrose supermarkets 
division, the sickness absence rate hovered around 3% between 2010 and 2013, the John 
Lewis Department store rates were the same. Corporate staff and those in partnership 
services had even lower rates at around 1%. The average sickness absence rate in 
Waitrose in 2013 was 3.32% this was a slight increase over the 3.08% of 2012. So, 
these data contrast with the pattern found in Eroski. The explanation may be traced 
rather more to management than to ownership per se.  
 
 
Attitudes and satisfaction 
 
If engagement can be indicated by attitude survey response rates then the JLP scores are 
very high – averaging around 96%. Staff newly recruited to the Partnership – as in those 
instances where new branches are opened – consistently award higher scores on all 
question items than established members. For example, the advocacy question, ‘I would 
recommend the partnership as a great place to work’, achieved a 92.9% average positive 
answer in the new branches in 2013 compared with 88.6% in existing branches (still an 
impressively high score). These data also suggest a novelty effect and perhaps more 
demanding expectations of established partners. 
 
Data was assembled which identified the highest scoring branches in the partnership 
attitude surveys – that is, those branches where employees reported they were most 
satisfied and apparently more highly committed. This revealed that the branches scoring 
highest on these surveys increased sales by 7% per annum during the three-year period 
(2011 to 2013 inclusive). This compared to an average sales increase across all branches 
during this period of 3.5%. Verbatim, free text, responses relating to local management 
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were: personal qualities such as showing trust and respect for partners, being open and 
honest. When interacting with partners these branch managers were seen to take an 
interest in the partners, deal with questions in an open manner and listen to partners. 
They also gave feedback and were seen to manage performance.  
 
Direct comparison can be made between Partners and non-partner employees in the 
warehousing/Regional Distribution Centres (RDCs). Some are operated by partners and 
some are outsourced to a provider company (Kuehne and Nagel). The results show that 
the contractor company is just as productive as the partner-operated sites. Managers 
tend to argue that the real ‘partnership difference’ is felt (and counts more) not so much 
in these support roles but in the customer-facing settings of the selling floor.  
  
The results of partner satisfaction surveys conducted in JLP in 2011, 2012 and 2013 
show positive overall results compared to an external benchmarking sample of 337 
organizations.  The survey shows, for each of the 35 questions, a comparison with 
median and upper quartile responses of similar questions by employees of the 
benchmarking sample. For 18 questions, satisfaction of JLP partners is higher than the 
upper quartile of the sample and in 6 other question areas the answers are over the 
median of the sample. Table 6 shows some key examples. 
 
Table 6: JLP employee attitude scores compared with benchmark firms (positive 
comparisons) 
 
 JLP 
score 
External benchmark firms’ scores 
Question  Median 
external  
Upper 
quartile 
external 
Sample 
size 
(No of 
firms) 
Sample size (no. 
of employees) 
      
I understand how 
my work 
contributes to the 
success of the 
organisation 
92 86 91 286 1,450,688 
      
I value the range of 
benefits that are 
available to me 
95 47 61 255 1,492, 977 
      
We manage 
change well  
66 34 44 224 484,765 
 
 
      
This is a socially 
responsible 
employer 
88 72 83 21 24,141 
      
I would 
recommend 
87 63 73 337 1,824,000 
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[organisation] as a 
great place to work 
 
As Table 6 shows, the Partnership even as a large employer with around 90,000 
employees records some well-above average scores when compared with benchmark 
companies. The value of the benefits stand out as a distinctive feature. Some 95% of 
respondents answered in a positive way to this which compared very favourably with 
only 47% of median responses in benchmark companies and 6% of upper quartile 
companies. JLP is likewise seen as ‘a great place to work’ and as a socially responsible 
employer. 
 
These are, perhaps, as expected for a well-known, employee-owned organisation. And 
yet, as with the Eroski case, the results are not always in the positive direction. On the 
contrary, there are some surprising patterns as shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: JLP employee attitude scores compared with benchmark firms (negative 
comparisons) 
 
 JLP score External benchmark firms’ scores  
Question  Median 
external 
Upper 
quartile 
external 
Sample 
size 
(No of 
firms) 
Sample 
size (no. of 
employees)
My line managers 
communicates with 
me regularly and 
effectively 
73 74 78 120 328,889 
      
My line manager 
encourages us to find 
better ways to do 
things as a team 
67 72 76 130 370,019 
      
My ideas to improve 
our business are 
welcomed 
65 77 81 171 693,765 
      
My line manager 
gives me regular 
feedback 
60 63 69 297 1,522,678 
      
There is a strong sense 
of teamwork 
72 81 86 109 364,765 
 
 
 As Table 7 shows, the Partnership scores relatively low marks in some items in which 
there should be an employee-owned advantage: teamwork, communication, 
acknowledgement, participation, ideas welcomed. On the face of it, these are all 
surprising results.  
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The most obvious explanation of these lower scores relative to the benchmark firms is 
that JLP staff have been encouraged to believe that their organization should be 
exemplary in these regards. In other words, the baseline of expectations is much higher 
than in comparative firms where expectation on such dimensions may be much lower.  
There is some evidence to support this thesis in the tendency for staff in retail outlets 
acquired by JLP to record very high satisfaction rates in the first couple of years after 
take-over. But, there could possibly be another reason: increasingly, managers appear to 
be taking the important decisions and the long-standing partners with longer memories 
may be expressing their displeasure at this development.   
 
Also on the negative side, it seems that even if JLP managers are able to engage 
partners in day to day work, it is more difficult to engage them in participation on 
democratic bodies: 
 
 From my experience, only a fraction of the workforce actually engages with 
councils and partner voice or believes it's effective and actually buys into it. 
There is apathy towards the councils. Whether you say it's 50% of partners or 
two-thirds of partners are apathetic, it's a big chunk of the workforce. (JLP 
Manager) 
 
It seems that peer-monitoring plays a bigger role in JLP than in Eroski. In part, this is 
linked to a pay for performance system that is criticized in many interviews as 
insufficient:  
 
The Partnership is completing a review of its pay policy regarding pay for 
performance. There are partners who clearly recognise that we don’t 
performance manage well, and it articulates itself at a local level around partners 
not liking to be taken for a ride for somebody who’s off sick, but they know they 
were out the night before and couldn’t get up in the morning. It’s also come in 
because there’s a feeling that we haven’t got the link right between pay and 
performance.  (JLP Manager) 
 
The limited pay differentials issue was also found in JLP though to a far lesser extent 
than in Eroski. Part of the reason here is that the scope for pay differentials is much 
higher in JLP. The highest salary in JLP is limited to 75 times the average pay of a 
selling partner (a huge contrast with the 7.8 to 1 differential in Eroski). These higher 
pay differentials in JLP have enabled it to attract high-performing managers from 
competing firms. Hence, JLP is not reliant on internal promotion. Access to leading-
edge knowledge is made available and the competition among managers means that 
there is far less scope for complacency.   
 
One director identified three components of the JLP model and insisted that the basis 
was the collective ownership even if it was not the whole story. Ownership gave 
commitment and engagement, it also promoted trust because the business was not run 
on the basis of exploitation of one group of another. And shared ownership allows a 
basis for investment decisions of a long term nature. 
 
Ownership is mediated through a whole series of institutions, structural and normative, 
to achieve its full impact. There is a psychological and moral implication. As one senior 
manager commented, ‘when you own the place you make sure the lights are off when 
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everyone leaves a room’. The sense of ownership was thus regarded as hugely important 
as a source of discretionary effort. But, paradoxically, managers also argued that 
partners’ commitment and system efficiency could be negatively related; the reason 
being that high commitment and exceptional discretionary effort by individuals and 
teams may be used to compensate for process and system inefficiencies.  
 
 
The overall managerial analysis was that while JLP builds on an emotional base of 
ownership, ultimately it is the contribution from leadership that matters. Without 
leadership, it was claimed, there is a tendency for co-owned businesses to become too 
complacent.  
 
The JLP case suggests that employee ownership is used as a foundation upon which can 
be built a complex array of interlocking values, meanings, performance management 
methods and a rationale for leadership.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
We began the analysis by noting that a key rationale for employee-owned enterprises is 
the idea that workers in such enterprises would be more engaged and would be inclined 
to expend discretionary effort for the success of the enterprise. In other words, they 
would take-on many of the attributes of conventional owners. To an extent we found 
this to be true but, in addition, we have noted the perceived minuses of employee 
ownership and the way some managers tended to give voice to these. 
 
As a reaction to the mixed results arising from research based on the simple ownership 
variable, more sophisticated analyses have been undertaken. Most notably, these have 
included exploration of the “three-pronged” hypothesis (Kruse et al. 2004; Kaarsemaker 
and Poustma, 2006). This underscored the necessity of complementing employee 
ownership with increased employee participation in decision making and with 
supportive human resource policies. We sought to contribute to this body of literature 
by helping to explain why some empirical studies such as those by Arando et al (2011) 
and Luu (2011) have produced results which appear not to support the three-pronged 
hypothesis.   
 
The methodology used in our study, and mainly the information obtained from 
interviewed managers, allows us to shed some additional light on this debate. As a 
consequence, we do not consider that the “three pronged hypothesis” actually does fail 
in the cases of Eroski and JLP. The reason for some of the negative attitudinal and 
behavioural responses of employee owners in Eroski could be that some of the human 
resource policies considered as ‘innovative’ by previous researchers, also generate some 
negative outcomes. We also find that some environmental factors, not considered in 
previous research, also explain in part some negative outcomes in Eroski and that some 
Eroski managers tended to give emphasis to the restrictive elements of cooperative 
enterprises especially in an economic context which they saw as requiring decisive 
adaptive action. 
 
Eroski managers argued that the employment security policy can promote 
‘complacency’ – an argument also found in JLP. The patterns and causal relationships 
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found in both cases allow us to support some of the theoretical and empirical research 
that has been reported in relation to behaviours in employee owned firms. In both cases, 
we find some positive responses to employee ownership running alongside negative 
scores based on higher expectations. In addition, we found a tendency, especially 
among Eroski managers, to take for granted the positive attributes of co-ownership. As 
a result, these managers were inclined to emphasize the restrictive elements as far as 
managerial action was concerned and to discount the positive aspects. In JLP, there was 
an established cultural expectation for managers to rehearse the positive attributes.  In 
addition, JLP managers had built an acceptance of the legitimacy and need for agile 
responses to commercial pressures – including, for example, redundancies in special 
circumstances, subject to due process.   
 
Klein’s extrinsic satisfaction model suggests that employee ownership increases 
commitment if it is materially rewarding for employees - something that was true in 
both companies until 2008. But the situation has not been like this in Eroski for the 
2009-2015 period. Instead of profit sharing and receiving interests for the capital 
invested in the company as in the past, coop members in Eroski have had to face 
“extornos” or loss sharing, together with wage reductions and increasing working hours. 
Those decisions have been ‘supported’ by a huge majority of voting members (in terms 
of votes). This was interpreted by managers as a sign of commitment. Yet, at the same 
time, the resulting measures have generated dissatisfaction and a growing absenteeism 
rate. Such responses have not been analysed in previous Mondragon literature. 
 
Limitations arising from the methodology need to be borne in mind. The first point to 
note is that the cases researched represent two of the biggest and longer lasting 
employee owned companies in the world. Those kind of companies are scarce and many 
of our findings may be difficult to replicate in much smaller employee-owned 
companies. Second, in addition to the empirical data on absenteeism, employee turnover 
and employee satisfaction survey results, we gave special attention to the ways in which 
managerial actors made sense of these data and employee ownership effects more 
generally. In interview situations these informants tended to emphasise the restrictions 
on managerial action and in so doing they tended to take for granted the positive aspects 
of employee ownership.  
 
However, the benefits of our methodology were that in selecting two successful and 
long-standing cases in different international cultural contexts we were able to assess 
developments over time and across economic cycles. The two cases were in similar 
industry sectors and they shared many attributes.  
 
Even the researchers that have analyzed the resilience of Mondragon cooperatives have 
usually ignored that fact that the austerity measures that allow resilience (lower wages, 
longer working hours) also impact on dissatisfaction. A recent Mondragon internal 
analysis (Ortega and Uriarte, 2015) which seeks to explain why its biggest and oldest 
industrial cooperative, Fagor Electrodomésticos, failed in 2013, allows insight into 
some of the negative attitudinal and behavioural responses – such as emotional distance 
of the coop owner towards the cooperative, complacency and shirking, and a readiness 
to voice demands. Together with other negative outcomes such as low self-
responsibility and supervisors shirking their monitoring tasks, these problems resonate 
with those we have identified in Eroski. Likewise, an analysis of the failure of Fagor 
Electrodomésticos (Ortega and Uriarte, 2015) noted that egalitarianism between coops 
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and maintaining similar pay levels in both successful and unsuccessful companies 
through inter-cooperative solidarity had impeded a rapid response when the first 
symptoms of the crisis appeared. In other words, attributes of strengths also contained 
seeds of weaknesses.   
 
Kaarsemaker and Poustma (2006) and Caramelli (2011) stress the need of new research 
to account for environmental factors. The effect of environmental factors in Eroski (low 
dynamism of Basque and Spanish labour markets, high unemployment rates) partially 
explains the extremely low voluntary turnover rates. While low voluntary turnover can 
be a positive indicator, under some circumstances it can also be a negative one. The 
more dynamic labor market in the parts of the UK where JLP mainly operates (the 
affluent south) makes it easier for dissatisfied partners to leave the company.        
  
The research in John Lewis revealed that managers were alive to the commercial 
potential of the co-ownership model and took many active steps to realize its potential. 
They invested heavily in the model through ensuring the health of the partner 
democracy structures and procedures. They intervened to periodically revitalize the 
democratic features to counter any drift to atrophy. Further, they invested heavily in 
communication of the meaning of the partnership. The Partnership had to be ‘nicer’ 
(taking into full account the interests of its members) but it also had to be ‘better’ (in all 
respects including customers service and the shopping experience as a whole) than the 
competition. The two were part of one whole. The key point was that the managers 
added a very strong ‘fourth prong’ – namely, an extraordinarily active managerial input 
to shore-up the employee-ownership mechanisms and crucially to interpret and 
continually reinterpret its ‘meaning’.  
 
Thus, each of the prongs of employee ownership are required (intrinsic/emotional 
attachment to the idea of being an owner, the accrual of financial reward from 
ownership and associated effort, and the participation which ownership rights confer) 
but on their own these may still not be enough.  Alongside an emphasis on external 
economic and social factors, we have added a governing inner-contextual factor – the 
influence of management in harnessing the employee ownership idea, breathing life and 
meaning into it, investing in the necessary support systems to make it real, and, most of 
all, communicating a sense of direction and legitimacy to a version of industrial 
democracy which is viable and sustainable.    
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